Friday, 14 December 2007

Personality: the big 5

Having recently had my first child, Isabel, make an appearance on the scene, I've got interested in personality and how it's formed.

The "big five" personality traits most commonly used are:
- extraversion (response to positive stimuli)
- neuroticism (reponse to negative stimuli)
- conscientiousness (impulse control)
- agreeableness (acting on empathy)
- openness (breadth of activation)

In terms of where they come from, the mainstream of research indicates:
- 40-50% of the variation is set via inheritance
- of the remaining 50-60% of variance, some will be due to random brain wiring and some to random environmental influences
- parental influence has no effect

The last point, in particular, is somewhat counter-intuitive. There's a natural association in most people's minds between types of family atmosphere and the character of the adults who result from growing up in it. But as far as people can tell from studies designed to tease out the effects of genes vs environment (twin studies, adoption studies, etc), the effect is from inherited tendency rather than how a child is bought up. Extraverted parents have extraverted children because the child has a natural tendedncy, not because the child is growing up in an extraverted household. And so on.

Does this make any difference to how one should act as a parent? Perhaps. One might draw the conclusion that you should pay attention to how your child seems to be as an individual, rather than viewing it as a blank template on which behaviour must be imposed and molded.

In terms of what one might wish for one's child, most of the traits are pretty neutral. What you want is for people to find a path that is in sympathy with their personality.

For example - personally, I'm very high on agreeableness and openness, high on extraversion and conscientiousness, and average on neuroticism. This means I'm great on stuff involving solving ill-defined problems that need wide co-operation across a number of people to tackle, and where attention to detail is important. I'm crap on stuff involving carrying out someone else's plan, where it's going to cause a lot of people pain, and lots of things will go wrong in the execution that I can't do anything to prevent.

So my current job troubleshooting analytics-related problems across derivatives trading areas is a good match. But maybe I should put off joining the army for a while longer.

And as for Isabel? Bearing in mind she's only 4 months old so far, it's hard to tell. I do have one wish: I hope that she's not at the top end in neuroticism, as by definition it's a lot harder to be happy if you are. And for myself, I hope I can help her to get the most out of life, however she turns out.

Thursday, 29 November 2007

xmas

"International Icon" Tarot deck
Music written in last 10 years

E: Skandium Kivi holders (86 Marylebone High St, W1U 4QS)

Wednesday, 14 November 2007

Organisations and Software Structure

I've moved employers recently, and was struck by how just how much difference there was between old and new in what software was easy to write, and what software was hard to write.

Here's a law dating back to the 1970s:

Conway's Law: Any organization that designs a system will produce a design whose structure is a copy of the organization's communication structure.


More than 25 years ago, a book called The Psychology Of Computer Programming talked at length about this kind of thing.

For example, a compiler's internal structure will likely be split along lines dictated by the existing expertise and political structure, rather than some structure purely dictated by technological considerations.

However, many technologists tend to frame their view of the world using technical considerations in preference to political/organisational considerations. The upshot can be that people attempt to defend the structure of a software project in technical terms because they think that other drivers of the structure aren't (or shouldn't be) relevant. If, instead, there was a wider recognition that it's perfectly OK for non-technical considerations to be the most important shaping factor on the structure of software, rational debate about the structure would be easier; for instance, people would address broken software structure by addressing the underlying organisational mismatch, rather than searching for purely technical fixes.

It's worth keeping this principle in mind when a technological goal seems strangely hard to accomplish. Look at how the effort is being organised, and how well it fits with the people who are actually supposed to do the work. Is it something that requires a high degree of inter-team co-ordination in an environment where autonomy is highly prized? Or, conversely, is it something that requires initiative and a number of prototyping runs in an environment where blaming behaviour is common, and failure attracts censure? In either of those two cases, you've got a problem.

Instead of banging your head against a brick wall, look at how you can orient things to align with the setting you're working in. If autonomy is highly prized, keep the shared infrastructure as loose and minimal as possible, and bend over backwards to encourage participation (or it won't happen). If control and blaming are more the order of the day, use the hierarchy for what it's good at, and get skunk-works set up to do the more experimental stuff, providing a separate safe environment for the riskier failure-prone part.

Sunday, 3 June 2007

Baby Stuff

working list of recommendations for baby gear

buggies:
Maclaren Techno XT (Nick, Helen, Chris), Phil+Ted E3 for extendibility (Alex, Claudia), Bobconfort Loola (Judy), Backwards when young is nice (Fraser), Quinny later (Fiona)
cots: Mothercare. (Chris) Try one you can attach to bed (Claire) Mamas+Papas (Fiona)
bedding: get grobags (Chris, Fiona) / sleeping bags (Helen), M&P AntiAllergy Mattress (Fiona)
carriers: BabyBjorn Active (Nick, Helen, Claire, Alex, Judy, Fiona) but mind your back (Fraser), Vaude rucksack when older (Fraser)
slings: get several since you're not a driver, try them, keep what works (Claire)
nappies: Sainsbury and Waitrose do biodegradable disposables (Helen, Alex), All the same anyway (Fiona)
breastpump: go electric (Chris, Helen), try Medula brand (Helen)
carseat: Mamas and Papas (Claire, Helen:Pliko P3, Fiona:?), Britax (Chris), Maxi Cosi (Alex, Fiona later)
feeding: Avant bottles and steam steriliser (Alex, Fiona)
baby chair: BabyBjorn (Alex)

books:
  • "Baby Whisperer" (Chris, Alex, Fiona)
  • "What To Expect - The First Year" by Tracy Hogg (Chris, Alex)
  • "First Time Parents" by Miriam Stoppard (Fiona)
  • "What to expect when you are breastfeeding..." by Clare Byam (Alex)
  • "Blooming Birth" by Lucy Atkins and Julia Guderian (Claire)
  • "3 in a bed" by Debra Jackson (Claire)
  • "Why Love Matters" by Susan G (Claire)
websites:
other:
  • big changing bag (Fiona)
  • portable legible clock (Fiona)

Thursday, 10 May 2007

Evidence of heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents

A great paper, available here: www.snowpit.com.

"Even though people are capable of making decisions in a thorough and methodical way, it appears that most of the time they don’t. A growing body of research suggests that people unconsciously use simple rules of thumb, or heuristics, to navigate the routine complexities of modern life. In this paper, I examine evidence that four of these heuristics – familiarity, social proof, commitment and scarcity – have influenced the decisions of avalanche victims."

If you're interested in this kind of area, read stuff by Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky. But this is a good start.

The "Helpful Model"

I've worked in a number of investment banks, and the people there are very keen to "monetize their skills" as a hedge fund manager once put it to me.

In an environment where everyone's chasing the year-end bonus, it's easy for a self-reinforcing negative dynamic to develop. Team A views team B as out to get them. They act to defend themselves againt team B's (real or imagined) actions. Team B sees the actions of team A, and takes a corresponding action. Everyone ends up with an entrenched negative view of each other.

One alternative, referenced in Gerald Weinberg's Quality Software Management books, is called the "helpful model". The default assumption is that even if appearances might lead you to suspect otherwise, everyone is trying to be helpful. Of course, someone might reveal themselves to be out to stitch you up. But you start by assuming that everyone is trying to do the right thing, at least according to their definition of what "the right thing" is, and analyse things from that viewpoint.

A lot of people think that the "helpful model" is still unrealistic hippy nonsense. If that's your reaction, then try a quick thought experiment: figure out what your default way of analyzing people's actions and motives is, and then work out what is going to happen in your organisation if everyone thinks like you.

If you want to get all game-theoretic about it, you could view the "helpful model" as corresponding to "nice strategies" such as tit-for-tat in iterated prisoner's dilemma simulations. A "nice strategy" is one that starts off by being cooperative. What you do when it's clear that your game partner is not cooperating is a different question. "Nice" strategies co-operate well. Strategies that start by not cooperating ("defecting" in the terms of the prisoner's dilemma) don't interact so positively.

Monday, 16 April 2007

The Cult Of Execution

Over the last two years, for the first time, I've been trying out managing teams of varying sizes. Previously I've been a technical specialist, and while there's plenty of room for me to progress there, I'd got to the point where I figured some experience in coordinating the execution of work would be useful in terms of amplifying my effectiveness (in the sense of this bunch here: http://www.ayeconference.com/).

One of the interesting aspects of the managerial world (as someone coming relatively late to the manager party) is what I've started to call the "Cult Of Execution". To see what I mean, start reading periodicals such as the Harvard Business Review (http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu), and see how many times execution is mentioned as an end in itself.

Now, this is hardly surprising in one way. Executives are responsible for execution. That's their job! But as someone who views line management as another useful skill to do my best to acquire, rather than my main thing, I've started getting a bit of a sceptical air about this one.

No question that a manager needs to successfully execute projects if he or she is to get ahead. But what if, when you look a bit closer, you realise that either that the project has been executed in a manner which will lead to a lot of very expensive trouble later on, or that the project as delivered actually has no business value at all?

What is execution actually worth?

Execution in itself is not actually worth anything. Execution must create value or you're actually costing the organization money by taking resource away from other, potentially more useful activities.

So please don't tell me someone's a good manager because he's been successful at execution. Show me what he's executed, and how it's doing a year down the line.

Friday, 9 March 2007

IT and investment banking

A few observations on IT in investment banking. Some of these are well-known in the business, some seem rather more obscure (judging by people's actions anyway).

Banking experience is overpriced by many places. Once you get that banking job, even if you're mediocre, you're going to be overpaid compared to your skills and ability as long as you stay in the industry.

Many people in banking IT become less valuable over time. They see projects buckling under the pressure from the trading desk to deliver, and think that somehow practices such as unit and other testing, daily builds, and the like don't apply to banks. They get lazy and used to delivering low quality stuff for a high reward.

People coming from outside IB have often got better quality development experience than peers who have spent all their time in the IB sector. They're the ones who are more likely to be able to make a good business case for decent development practices.

The best thing to do if you're in a bank and recruiting is to actively seek people with no banking experience. Telecommunications. Games. Image Processing. Air Traffic Control. There's plenty of people out there who are great value. Many agencies will assume you want prior banking experience unless you explictly tell them otherwise. Do so.

If you're in banking IT, learn the maths and the business. Hardly anyone does, and that lack of a wider understanding is partly why it's so hard for people in IT to push good practice to the business. Learn the language and frames that everyone else is using rather than being stuck in a ghetto.

But conversely, if you're in banking IT, find a trading desk that understands technology. Otherwise you'll always be having to make the business case for good practices rather than meeting the business half-way. You need to be able to make the case, sure, but it's a waste of time and energy to have to do so continually. Many teams get tired of doing this, and end up hustled into too many short term fixes, as a result of which the whole development needs to be restarted every 4 or 5 years.

And finally, here are three reasons why banking IT systems aren't what they should be:
  1. the yearly bonus. The pressure is always on to deliver in time for the compensation round. Stuff is rushed out before it's ready, and without the testing in place to allow refactoring. Much of the following year is spent clearing up the resulting mess.
  2. turnover. People move between banks with great frequency. Average times in jobs depend on who you ask, but if you're in the same area for more than 2 years, you'll be starting to be an authority. The knowledge of a system's "theory", the metaphors and assumptions that underly its structure, degrades quickly.
  3. high entry cost. It takes a lot of money to set up as a bank. So banks can be inefficient everywhere in the organisation and still be OK. This is getting eroded by the hedge funds, but is still important.

Frames For Analysts

what is a frame?

Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. [1]

why should I care?

This essay is for you if you work in an analytical, scientific discipline, for instances - mathematical modelling and information technology. If you do, you're hopefully highly skilled in symbolic and logical manipulation, which means you can easily perceive the logical structure of arguments. But this ability comes with a downside. When two analysts end up on opposite sides of an issue, bad feeling can easily be created because both sides feel that they have "proved" that they are correct.
The end result is frequently that discussion is bogged down in technicalities. Frequently, meta-arguments develop other whether some deductive step is valid, or over the precise definition of ad hominem, etc.
The real problem, however, is frequently that the frames of the participants have produced different ways of modelling the situation. A purely analytical approach will not necessarily bring agreement at this point, since the difference is in the categories upon which the analytical discourse is based.
Why does this happen? And how can this problem be overcome - if, indeed, it can be overcome?

causes of framing mismatches

different evidence
What you have seen is not the same as what someone else has seen. However, people are not always explicit about the evidence that has gone into their framing - so it's easy for differences in direct physical evidence to be overlooked.
negative experiences
A single bad experience can condition people to take great pains to subsequently avoid whatever they perceive as the causes of that experience. This can cause framing differences in a number of ways. Firstly, people may not even be consciously aware of why they view a potential course of action in such a hostile fashion, and will fabricate logical arguments to justify their emotional reaction. If they are consciously aware of the source of their aversion, they may actually be mistaken as to the true cause(s) of the original bad experience. Even if they have a justified aversion, based on valid experience, they still need to convey this to others who will not have had the opportunity to learn the same lessons.
general psychological causes
Everyone suffers from a large number of
cognitive biases that impair the process of framing. One particularly relevant bias is confirmation bias, the way that information is fitted into one's current preconceptions: this can act as a filter so contrary information is not even consciously perceived. However, even if information that doesn't fit the current frame is perceived, it can still be ignored because of cognitive dissonance, the desire to intepret evidence so as to make decisions already made appear in a positive light. Finally, there is the understandable reluctance of people to invest energy in continually re-analysing and re-modelling situations.
institutional causes
Things are the way they are because they got that way - Gerald Weinberg
An organisation will have certain patterns of behaviour that are rewarded, and certain patterns of behaviour that are discouraged. This will inevitably shape people's perceptions of what is possible and/or desirable. For instance, a company with a dysfunctional IT infrastructure may end up not pursuing improvements that need IT infrastructure changes, because attempting to push such improvements through tends to have negative consequences for the individual(s) involved.
"stretching" frames
Sometimes, people attempting to construct post hoc justifications for a desired conclusion will - deliberately or otherwise - "stretch" a frame from an area where it is valid, to one where it is inapplicable. This can be particularly hard to deal with, since refuting arguments requires refuting the implicit framework in which the discourse is occuring.

bridging the framing gap

make assumptions explicit
This is the single most powerful way to deal with incorrect frames. A large part of a frame's power derives from its implicit nature.
discuss alternative frames
Often people will be unaware that more than one valid frame exists. This is particularly true for people without a background of studying subjects that make use of frame analysis. By setting out more than one way of framing an analysis, the possibility of alternatives is opened up.
you've been framed
Don't be surprised if people deliberately set up inappropriate frames for discussing a topic. Nowadays, framing is increasingly part of any politician's armoury. Look for attempts by others to alter frames, rather than engaging with the underlying issues. If an organisation's dominated by framing-oriented shuffles rather than concrete discussion, that's not a good sign.

References
(Gitlin, Todd. 1980. The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles, CA & London, U.K.: University of California Press.)